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How Chen Shui-bian Won: 
The 2004 Taiwan 
Presidential Election and Its 
ltnplications 
--- VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
Election, Democratic Deepening, and Strategic Implications 
The year 2004 is the year of elections. In addition to America's race for the White House, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan all 
have national elections to replace their executives or legisla-
tors. But of these, only Taiwan's (the official name remains 
Republic of China, ROC for short) March 20 presidential elec-
tion, combined with a first-ever nationwide referendum, meant 
high-stake international conseguences involving two nuclear 
giants- the United States and the People's Republic of China 
(PRC, or China). 
With Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's campaign focusing on 
a distinctive "Taiwan identity" and calling for direct democracy to 
deepen Taiwan's democracy, China equated Chen's electioneering 
with Taiwan independence. This it had vowed to crush with force. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. eagerly sought to defuse tensions and avoid a 
military conflict in the Taiwan Strait at a time when its resources were 
stretched thin by Iraq and the ami-terror war. 
The 2004 election marked only the third time that Taiwan voters 
chose their head of state, a choice never given to those who have in 
the past and who now live in mainland China. A year earlier, in 2003, 
Chen's reelection prospects appeared bleak. In 2000, facing a divided 
opposition, he won with only 39 percent of the vote. But this time 
Chen faced a united ticket, consisting of Lien Chan, Chairman of the 
Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, usually called the KMT), 
who polled 23.1 percent in 2000, and James Soong, Chairman of the 
People First Party (PFP), who garnered 37.6 percent in 2000. The 
combined ticket, generally referred to as Pan-Blue, made Lien-Soong 
the odds-on favorites. The Chcn-Lu ticket, supported by the Taiwan 
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s9lidarity Union (TSU) as well as by Chen's Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) is referred to as Pan-Green. 
Aside from the year 2000 numbers, the performance of Chen's 
novice administration, ranging from his dealing with the economy, 
to management of cross-strait relations or international space, was 
largely mediocre. Initially the Chen administration blamed the 
intractable parliamentary opposition (which in fact held the major-
ity of seats) and the downturn in international markets for his prob-
lems. But as time went on, voters became less sympathetic to his 
claims. The Pan-Blue election strategy thus sought to capitalize on 
Chen's weakness and present itself as a more experienced alternative. 
After all, the KMT had governed Taiwan for fifty years before being 
defeated by Chen in 2000. 
Chen's reelection bid appeared to suffer a further blow when 
U.S. President George W. Bush publicly rebuked him for some of his 
reelection tactics in front of the visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
on December 9, 2003. Bush declared: 
The United States government's policy is one China, based upon the 
three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We oppose any 
unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. 
And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate 
that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the 
status quo, which we oppose.• 
Searching for a way to mobilize his base and increase his vote, 
Chen had called for a "defensive referendum" on relations with 
China to be conducted on the same day of the presidential election. 
Although the questions were rather anodyne (see Note 4 below), they 
were seen in both Washington and Beijing as possibly forming a prec-
edent for deciding on a future new constitution, and therefore as a 
dangerous precursor to a declaration of Taiwan independence. The 
U.S. also feared that with China outraged, the situation could spin 
out of control and sought to rein in Chen. 
Given all these factors, most analysts, including the respected 
Economist Intelligence Unit, wrote Chen off, and most polls, except 
the DPP internal polls, predicted a Pan-Blue win. 
But the resilient Chen proved everybody wrong. He won a second 
term, albeit by a mere 0.2 percent (50.1 percent vs. 49.9 percent), or 
29,518 votes out of a total of 12.91 million votes cast (the voter turnout 
was 80.3 percent). The Pan-Blues challenged the results in the streets 
and in the court. They questioned the suspicious circumstances sur-
I. The White House, "Presidem Bush ;and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press." Available 
at http:/fwww.whitehouse.gov/newslrcleases/2003/ 12/20031209-2 html. 
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rounding the election-eve shooting incident, which slightly injured 
Chen and his running mate Vice President Annette Lu, and the large 
number of ballots counted as invalid. 
Most analysts believe that a court-ordered recount (still continu-
ing as this is written) in the end will reaffirm the results. Bur how can 
Chen's improbable victory be explained? 
Explaining the Improbable 
There can be no question as to the significance of Chen's reelec-
tion. Critics argued that Chen lacked a true mandate since his victory 
in 2000 was due to a split opposition, which together garnered more 
votes than he. But now Chen received a majority in a two-way race. 
When Lien and Soong joined hands in early 2003, polls showed Chen 
trailing by 15-20 percent. Yet, as the election ended, he gained 1.49 
million more votes than last time, an increase of more than 10 percent. 
What explained his dramatic comeback? 
The most important reason was that Chen ran an excellent cam-
paign. His strategy focused on appropriating the so-called Taiwan 
identity (or Taiwan-first consciousness) and controlling the agenda. 
The Table below shows that a clear cultural revolution has occurred 
on Taiwan's political scene during the past decade- contemporaneous 
with Taiwan's democratization. 1\1ore and more people identify them-
selves as "Taiwanese" or "both Taiwanese and Chinese." Between 
1992 and 2003, those who identified themselves as "Chinese" dropped 
from 26.2 percent to 7.7 percent, whereas those who identified them-
selves as "Taiwanese" rose from 17.3 percent to 43.2 percent- an all-
time high and even higher than "both Taiwanese and Chinese." 
Tablet :National Identity Distributions (percentages) 
Select poll lam I am both lam Missing 
dates Taiwanese Taiwanese and Chinese Data(-
Chinese 
Jun 1992 17.3 45.4 26.2 ll.O 
Jun 1996 23.1 50.9 15.8 10.2 
Jun 2000 36.9 43.8 13.1 6.2 
Dec 2001 43.2 41.8 10.3 4.7 
Dec 2003 43.2 42.9 7.7 6.3 
" Missmg data includes Mdo not know,~ "no response,~ etc. 
Source: National Chengchi Uni,·cmt) Election Study Center data. 
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In other words, in Taiwan, the process of democratization has 
been accompanied by a cultural movement- indigenization, or to use 
an easier term, Taiwanization. Cultural practices such as the increased 
emphasis of Taiwanese, rather than Chinese, history and geography 
in textbooks, the increased use of the Minnan language rather than 
Mandarin2 in daily discourse and political campaigning, and other 
moves aimed at desinification, such as the so-called zheng-ming -
Rectify (Taiwan's) name- campaign, worked in that direction. So did 
a shared memory that was partially shaped by the PRC's intimidation 
and oppression, partially by years of discrimination practiced against 
them by the mainlanders who fled to Taiwan along with Chiang Kai-
shek in 1949. These things gave rise to a new sense of identity among 
those born on the island, and especially among those whose grand-
parents and great grandparents had been born there as well. These 
Taiwanese quite naturally saw "Chinese" as the opposing "other" and 
this became the psychological foundation for a nascent new nation 
-Taiwan- as a newly formed "imagined community." 
Chen's strategy reflected his understanding of two basic premises: 
(1) The 2004 election is not just about democratic consolidation; it 
also marks a step forward in nation-building. {2) A majority of the 
electorate will support the party that embodies this Taiwan identity. 
Chen believed that the DPP's 1999 Resolution on Taiwan's 
Future captured the sentiment or awareness of most people on 
Taiwan, that the main ideas of the document have become main-
stream values in Taiwan. Many of his actions appeared to have 
been guided by the Resolution. 
The Resolution maintains that as a result of Taiwan's political 
reform and democratic elections since the mid-1980s, Taiwan "has in 
reality already become a democratic independent country." It asserts 
that Taiwan is a sovereign independent state whose territory extends 
only to Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu, and associated islands and 
their adjacent waters. "Taiwan, although its name is the Republic of 
China according to the current constitution, does not belong to the 
PRC" and "any alteration of this separate status must be decided by 
all the inhabitants in Taiwan through a referendum." 
Having established his party as a "Taiwan-first" party and 
branded the Pan-Blue as "China-first," Chen seized the agenda from 
the opposition: his statement that there now existed "one country on 
2. Mandarin, or Kuo Yu (National Speech) is the official language of China and was for Taiwan 
as well during the period of KMT rule on the island. In fact, Minnan, the language spoken by 
most ethnic Taiwanese once wa.s banned from use in schools. But that ban has been lifted, usc 
of Min nan has grown steadily in all conrexts, and anyone eager for dcction had better be able to 
usc it in campaign speeches. Linguistically, it is related to Mandarin about in the same way as 
Swedish is related to German, i.e. both descended from a common ancestor language. 
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each side of the Taiwan Strait," his proposals for referenda, a new 
constitution, etc. all served to reinforce his stance as defender of the 
Taiwan identity. 
In addition, Chen's campaign methodically worked to increase the 
votes for him and assigned numerical targets to the various regions 
on Taiwan's political map. In geographic terms, to win he needed to 
(1) do well in Southern Taiwan- the DPP's traditional stronghold; (2) 
hold on in northern and central Taiwan- the Pan-Blue's stronghold; 
and (3) make inroads into the Hakka communities which had sup-
ported the KMT in the past.3 As it turned out, among Taiwan's 25 
local administrative divisions (counties/cities), the Pan-Blue won 13 
(many sparsely populated), and the DPP won 12 (including several of 
the most populous counties). Since the electoral system of Taiwan's 
presidential election is first-past-the-post with the entire country as 
one single constituency, rather than the American-style electoral col-
lege, the more populous counties and cities that went to the DPP's 
column helped catapult Chen to victory. 
In contrast to the superior strategy and charismatic candidate of 
the DPP campaign, the Pan-Blue ticket suffered from older, weaker 
candidates (Lien was 69 and Soong was 61- in contrast to the 53-year-
old Chen), and many voters saw them as more interested in regaining 
power than enacting reforms. Cb mposed of two parties cooperating 
uneasily, the campaigns seemed uncoordinated and platforms failed to 
excite the imagination. For example, the Pan-Blue ticket chose not to 
publish a white paper on cross-strait relations because anything that 
could achieve consensus approval from both KMT and PFP would 
probably be attacked as pro· China by Chen. Nor could Pan-Blue get 
traction with their claims that Chen's harping on Taiwanese identity 
was dividing the community. 
Another factor was that when former KMT President Lee Teng-
hui joined the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a DPP campaign ally, 
he brought with him some of his previous KMT supporters, who now 
voted for Chen. 
Finally, there was the unexpected X-factor. In 2000, the last-minute 
endorsement by Dr. Lee Yuan-tse, a Nobel Laureate and President of 
Academia Sinica, added 3· 5 percent of the votes for Chen. This time, 
the election-eve wounding of President Chen and Vice President Lu 
by gunshots at a campaign rally appeared to have added quite a few 
"sympathy votes" to Chen's margin. 
3 . The Hakka arc an ethnic group distinct in language and culture from the Minnan-speaking Tai-
wanese, but their ancestors also migrated to Taiwan from the mainland in the 18th and 19th cen· 
turics. Though relatively small in numbers compared to their neighbors, whether on Taiwan, 
the mainland, or in Southeast Asia, the Hakka have contributed many of the 20th Century's 
Chinese leaders including Sun Yat-scn, Deng Xiaoping, Lee Teng-hui, Lee Kuan Yu. 
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II N~A 
Meanwhile, the two referenda failed, as they did not reach the legal 
quorum (50 percent of all eligible voters). 1 But it should be noted that 
among those who picked up the referenda ballots, about 92 percent 
voted yes. Although the defeat of the referenda reduced Chen's luster 
somewhat, he gained by establishing them as an important precedent. 
The defeat also gave Beijing a partial victory, because the referenda, 
which Beijing feared would set a precedent for declaration of Taiwan 
independence, did not succeed. 
Implications of the Election 
The election entails far-reaching implications for both Taiwan's 
domestic politics and external relations. Chen's campaign secured an 
improbable victory, but it also deeply divided the society and led to a 
very nervous international community. Taiwan's young democracy is 
being tested. That Pan-Blue still complains about plots and a "stolen 
election," casts a shadow over Taiwan's democratic consolidation. 
The full domestic impact of the election may not be felt until after 
the December 2004 Legislative Yuan elections. As Table 2 shows, the 
KMT's share of parliamentary seats has steadily declined over the last 
five elections. The DPP and its ally TSU currently hold but 40 percent 
of the seats in the current legislature. If the DPP-TSU alliance can 
gain a comfortable majority in December, it will certainly reduce the 
gridlock that is said to hamper DPP performance. Meanwhile, the New 
Party (NP) and Soong's People's First Party (PFP) have agreed in prin-
ciple to rejoin the KMT, though details remain to be worked out. 
Table 2 : Legislative Yuan Seat Shares After Elections (Percentages) 
Party 
KMT 
DPP 
NP 
PTF 
TSU 
Others* 
1989 1992 1995 
60.8 53.0 46.1 
28.3 31.0 33.2 
13.0 
10.9 16.0 7.8 
:} Small parties and independents 
Source: Cenml Election Commission data. 
1998 2001 
46.4 28.6 
29.6 33.4 
7.1 2.6 
17.0 
4. The texts of the two referenda were: (I) The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue 
be resolved through peaceful means. Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missi!es it 
has targeted at Taiwan and openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that 
the Government should acquire more advanced ami-missile we;~pons to strengthen T;uwan's self-
defense capability? And (2) Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiations 
with Mainland China on the emblishment of a "peace and mbility" framework for cross-strait 
interactions in order to build consensus for the welfare of the people on both sides? 
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The Pan-Blue alliance, originally formed to defeat the common 
enemy, but now likely to recombine into a broader KMT, faces an 
uncertain future. Will Lien and Soong step aside in favor of younger 
leaders such as Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jiou and Legislative Yuan 
Speaker Wang Chin-ping, who stand a better chance against the DPP? 
And will the party merger drive "the Light Blues" (moderate Taiwan-
ese still within the KMT alliance) toward the DPP or TSU? 
Looking Ahead 
With Chen reelected, and free from pressure for reelection since 
he cannot run again, the question became would he push ahead to try 
to make his constitutional referendum proposal his legacy. 
In the days following his March election, this prospect caused deep 
concern in the U.S., China, and other countries in the Western Pacific, 
such as Japan. The fear, of course, was that rash post-election state-
ments or actions by Chen could trigger military action by the PRC, 
which in turn would most likely lead to U.S. military intervention. 
In the most explicit exercise of "preventive diplomacy" regarding 
Taiwan, the U.S. got tough with Taipei in the weeks prior to Chen's 
inauguration on May 20. In Congressional testimony of April21, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for East A~ian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly 
warned, "Our efforts at deterring Chinese coercion might fail if Bei-
jing ever becomes convinced Taiwan has embarked on a course toward 
independence and permanent separation from China, and concludes 
that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts." He also said that the 
U.S. strongly supports Taiwan's democracy, though it does not support 
Taiwan independence: "A unilateral move toward independence will 
avail Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy" and could destroy 
Taiwan's hope for the future. Kelly also characterized PRC's strong 
statements as "empty threats" and "irresponsible." 
On May 17, just three days before Chen's inauguration for a 
second term, the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) issued a stern 
statement, warning that China would "thoroughly crush" any plot 
to split Taiwan from China. But it also dangled incentives, regarding 
transport, air traffic, telecommunications, military confidence build-
ing, and Taiwan's "international space." All were conditioned upon 
accepting Beijing's "one China" principle, something Taiwan cannot 
do since it would make the island republic into just one of the PRC's 
provinces. The U.S. condemned the bellicose language of threat of 
use of force, but also claimed to see positive elements. 
All eyes therefore focused on Chen's May 20 inaugural speech. 
In that speech, titled "Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan," 
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Chen addressed many of the U.S. concerns and moved to ease ten-
sions with China. Stressing peace, reconciliation, and the need for 
pragmatic steps to improve ties between the two sides, the speech was 
in sharp contrast to the harsher tone Chen adopted in the months 
before his narrow March reelection. Instead of fulfilling his pledge to 
replace Taiwan's constitution, adopted by the Chiang Kai-shek gov-
ernment in 1947 in China, with one he would seek to have sanctioned 
by referendum in 2006, he proposed a constitutional reengineering 
project, which would be aimed at improving governance and would 
exclude issues related to sovereignty, territory, or independence. 
Saying he would "not exclude any possibility" concerning future 
relations, he reaffirmed the "principles and pledges" unveiled in his 
2000 inaugural speech - implying a continuation of the policy of not 
declaring independence, changing the country's formal name or flag, 
etc., always provided China refrains from the use of force. Chen went 
even so far as to say he understood the historic context and reasons 
for Beijing's insistence on a "One China Principle"- though he could 
not to accept it as the precondition for talks. The U.S. called Chen's 
remarks "responsible and constructive," creating "an opportunity" 
for Taipei and Beijing to restore dialogue. 
In its first official response to Chen's speech, China's Taiwan 
Affairs Office spokesman Zhang Mingqing said that Beijing fell back 
on saying it would pay more attention to what Chen actually does 
than what he says. Zhang also accused Chen of being the root cause 
of tensions in the Taiwan Strait by his failure to accept "the one China 
principle." But these rather hackneyed words essentially constitute 
a place holder while the PRC leadership ponders its course. With 
Chen being both moderate and looking toward accomodation, and 
with Washington well satisfied with his words, can Beijing afford to 
remain completely intransigent? 
Right after Chen won reelection, gloom permeated Beijing's agen· 
cies dealing with Taiwan affairs. Many government-linked scholars 
argued that reunification could henceforth only be achieved through 
non-peaceful means. Premier Wen recently disclosed that China was 
"seriously considering" enacting a Unification Law, which would 
legally mandate the use of force if Taiwan is perceived to be perma-
nently separating from China. Despite these strong words, China 
seems to feel that its strategy of enlisting the U.S. to rein in Chen has 
achieved results. Thus, China will not take any immediate military 
action. For the foreseeable future, China's main concern will be to 
prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, rather than accomplish-
ing unification. However, its policy of using military modernization 
and missile build-up to put pressure on Taiwan will continue. 
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Continued "Muddling Through" 
The geopolitical tensions caused by the growth of democracy 
in Taiwan hides the fact that although each side of the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle talks of "maintaining the status quo," each pursues a 
different version of the concept. There is a phrase for this in Chinese: 
Same bed, different dreams. 
China interprets the status quo to mean that there is only one 
China, Taiwan is a province of that China; and thus Beijing owns 
sovereignty over Taiwan. Deploying missiles against a "renegade 
province" is an exercise of "sovereign right"- an "internal affair" and 
no other nation can interfere. But at the same time as it insists that 
Taiwan is an internal affair, it now consistently calls on Washington 
to intervene in that "internal affair" and constrain Taiwan. 
Taiwan's DPP sees the status quo as meaning Taiwan is already 
an independent nation, one that never has been ruled by the PRC. 
But even if it is not necessary for Taiwan to declare the independence 
it holds already, the DPP recognizes its economic dependence upon 
China and its military dependence on the U.S. As for the KMT, it no 
longer is clear just what it believes. Its last president, Lee Teng-hui, 
once said Taiwan and the mainland had a "special state-to-state rela-
tionship," analogous to that between West and East Germany, before 
" the latter's collapse. 
To regain U.S. control over cross-strait relations, in his April 
21 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 
Assistant Secretary Kelly asserted that the U.S. does not support 
unilateral moves that would change the status quo "as we define it" 
(emphasis added): 
For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against 
Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all 
aspects of cross-strait relations. For both sioes, it means no statements 
or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status. 
Although in the January 1, 1979 communique recognizing the 
PRC as the sole legal government of China, the U.S. acknowledged 
the Chinese position that Taiwan was a part of China, the U.S. stated 
no position of its own. Indeed Washington has carefully avoided 
taking a position as to Taiwan's status ever since the early 1950s, when 
President Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait 
and declared that Taiwan's status was unsettled. 
Washington's obsession with maintaining the status quo, with-
out taking into account new realities on the ground (e.g., Taiwan's 
democratic development and new national identity), exemplified by 
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Kelly's formula, reflects a desire to continually manage, rather than 
resolve, the Taiwan issue. Indeed, in assurances given Taiwan's former 
president Chiang Ching-kuo back in 1982, President Reagan said the 
United States had no intention of attempting to mediate between 
Taipei and Beijing; nor would it urge Taiwan to negotiate with the 
PRC. The basic idea has been that it is up to the parties to decide on a 
solution, if indeed there is to be a solution. Pending that outcome, the 
U.S. will continue to argue against unilateral change. And if need be, 
under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), it will 
supply Taiwan with defensive arms and would regard any attempt to 
coerce Taiwan militarily as a threat to international peace and secu-
rity and "a matter of grave concern" to the United States. 
However much it wishes to see the present status quo continue, 
U.S. policy makers must realize that self-determination is a natu-
ral external extension of democracy. Taiwan's elections as a nation 
building process will continue. And the panoply of democracy, as we 
have seen it in our own country, often means taking positions and 
making utterances that offend overseas audiences even as they appeal 
to local constituencies. Equating democratization with Taiwaniza-
tion and Desinificarion may well have adverse security implications, 
but Taiwan's identity-formation is a work in progress, in which "Chi-
neseness" plays an integral and not necessarily positive part. This 
requires Beijing to differentiate between "cultural China," of which 
Taiwan can be a part, and "political China," which Taiwan can also 
belong- but only through free choice. 
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